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Applying auction theory to the toxic-asset rescue plan currently released by the
United States Treasury Department, this paper demonstrates an equilibrium where
moderately poor bidders outbid rich bidders in such auctions. After defeating their
rich rivals and acquiring the toxic assets, such bidders will default on government-
provided loans whenever the toxic assets turn out to be unsalvageable. An alternative
mechanism is discussed.
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11 Introduction
The United States Treasury Department has recently published two plans ([3]) to rescue
the ﬁnancial sector by auctioning oﬀ its “toxic assets.” One is the Legacy Loan Program
(LLP) for risky home loans. The other is the Legacy Securities Program (LSP) for risky
mortgage-backed securities. The main feature of the plans is to subsidize the buyers of the
toxic assets with government-provided loans and equities.
Paul Krugman [2] has speculated that the rescue plan is an oﬀer of a gamble “to play
heads I win, tails the taxpayers lose.” At ﬁrst glance, this gamble analogy might sound
merely rhetorical, because even in the case of “tails” (that a toxic asset turns out to be
unsalvageable), a private investor who has bought the toxic asset does not necessarily walk
away from the loss, as to walk away he needs to default thereby forfeiting as least part of
his own assets including the good ones.
However, applying some straightforward logic of auction theory, I ﬁnd that the “heads
I win and tails the taxpayers lose” scenario is an outcome of high probability if the toxic
assets are auctioned oﬀ according to the rescue plans.
The main problem of these plans is due to the loan subsidies. When a toxic asset turns
out to be unsalvageable, the investor who has acquired it may be tempted to default on the
loan. The equilibrium analysis presented below shows that, unless bidders initially endowed
with moderately poor assets can be excluded from the auction, such bidders will outbid their
richer rivals and, upon winning, will default when the acquired toxic assets turn out to be
unsalvageable, leaving the loss to taxpayers.
2 The Model
A toxic asset is to be auctioned oﬀ to a set of bidders. The value of the asset is common to all
of them, and is equal to either v (“salvageable”) with probability π or zero (“unsalvageable”)
with probability 1 − π. The parameters v > 0 and π ∈ (0,1) are commonly known.
Each bidder is initially endowed with a quantity w of asset. Bidders may diﬀer from
one another in the quantities w that they have. Call w the type of a bidder.
The toxic asset is sold to one of the bidders via a Vickrey (second-price) auction with
zero reserve price. (Our result can be extended trivially to the case where the auction format
2is an English auction. The extension to Dutch and ﬁrst-price auctions may be done in the
spirit of Section 3.4.3 of Zheng [4].)
Suppose a bidder wins the auction at a price p. Then the government provides a
fraction γ ∈ [0,1) of p as a loan at an interest rate r ≥ 0 and pays half of the the rest as
equity, so the winner pays 1




(1 − γ)p ≤ w. (1)
Then the value of the toxic asset is realized. Denote the value by V . Then the winner
decides whether to default on its obligation of the loan.
If the winner does not default, it pays back its share of the loan, i.e., 1
2γp(1 + r), and
gets its share of the value of the toxic asset; hence it gets
1
2
(V − γp(1 + r)) (2)
currently. With the opportunity cost for its upfront payment 1
2(1−γ)p accounted according
to the market interest rate R, which is greater than the rate r provided by the government,
the winner’s payoﬀ in the entire game is equal to
1
2
(V − γp(1 + r)) −
1
2






p(1 + R − γ(R − r)). (3)
If the winner defaults, it forfeits the toxic asset and the current value of its own asset,
which is w less the upfront payment 1
2(1 − γ)p; so the winner gets








Hence the defaulting winner’s total payoﬀ from the whole game is equal to










(1 − γ)p(1 + R) = −(1 + R)w. (5)
This model corresponds to the LLP, with γ ≈ 0.86. The LSP diﬀers from the LLP in
that the government provides loans and equities before the investor buys any toxic asset.
However, LSP has the same feature of combining government-privided loans and equities,
with γ = 1/2. Hence the incentive for an investor to default is similar to that in the model.
The published provisions of the LLP and LSP seem to indicate that a private investor
does not have to borrow from the government up to γ of the price for the toxic asset.
However, as long as the borrowing rate r oﬀered by the government is below the market
rate R (otherwise there is no point of oﬀering the loan subsidy), the investor would opt for
taking full advantage of the government loan up to γ.
33 The Equilibrium
Let us start by analyzing a winner’s decision of default given the realization of the value V
of the toxic asset.
Lemma 1 Suppose a bidder with initially owned asset w > 0 has won the toxic asset at a
price p. When V = v, the winner does not default unless
v = (1 + r)γp and (1 − γ)p = 2w (6)
and is indiﬀerent about default if (6) holds. When V = 0, the winner defaults if
p(1 + R − γ(R − r)) > 2w(1 + R) (7)
and does not default if the opposite of (7) holds.
Proof Given the realized value V of the toxic asset and the already paid the upfront payment
1
2(1−γ)p, a winner defaults if his payoﬀ (2) from keeping the asset is less than the payoﬀ (4)
from default, and does not default if the inequality is reversed. Since the government would
not provide a loan that it knows can never be returned, 1
2(v −γp(1+r)) ≥ 0; by the budget
constraint (1), −(w − 1
2(1 − γ)p) ≤ 0. Thus, when V = v, (2) is greater than or equal
to (4), so the winner weakly prefers not to default, and the indiﬀerence holds only when
the two weak inequalities hold as equalities, i.e., Eq. (6). When V = 0, 1






is equivalent to (7).
Anticipating their future decision characterized by Lemma 1, bidders calculate their
expected payoﬀs from winning the toxic asset when its value V is still uncertain. Let u(p,w)
denote this expected payoﬀ for a bidder whose initial asset is w and who wins the toxic asset
at price p such that p satisﬁes the budget constraint (1).




















Proof In calculating a winner’s payoﬀ, we may assume without loss that a winner does not
default when V = v, as the only possible exception is when he is indiﬀerent about default
4(Lemma 1). Thus, when (7) holds, Lemma 1 implies that the winner defaults if and only if








p(1 + R − γ(R − r))

+ (1 − π)(−(1 + R)w),
which is the second branch of (8). When the opposite of (7) holds, Lemma 1 implies that
the winner does not default, so Eq. (3) gives






p(1 + R − γ(R − r)),
which is the ﬁrst branch of (8). Finally, when p =
2w(1+R)
1+R−γ(R−r), one can easily show that the
two branches are equal to each other.
Lemma 2 implies that the bidders’ preferences in our setup is a special case of the
private-value model, with the private value for a type-w bidder being πv
2 when the going
price p is below the cutoﬀ
2w(1+R)
1+R−γ(R−r), and otherwise πv
2 − (1 − π)(1 + R)w.
Assume that the penalty for violating the budget constraint (1) is larger than any
possible payoﬀ a bidder may obtain. Then our model is a standard Vickrey auction with
private values and budget constraints. As a fact in auction theory (e.g., Che and Gale [1]),
the dominant strategy equilibrium in this game is that every bidder submits a bid equal to
either a threshold price ˜ p(w) such that u(˜ p(w),w) = 0 or the highest price subject to the
budget constraint (1), whichever is lower. Let us calculate the threshold ˜ p(w).
Lemma 3 Extend the function u to the entire R2
+ according to Eq. (8), regardless of the






π(1+R−γ(R−r)) if (1 + R)w ≤ π
2v
πv
1+R−γ(R−r) if (1 + R)w ≥ π
2v.
(9)
Proof By Eq. (8), the function u(·,w) is continuous and strictly decreasing, with u(0,w) =
πv/2 > 0 and u(p,w) < 0 for suﬃciently large p. Thus, there exists a unique ˜ p(w) > 0 such
that u(˜ p(w),w) = 0. In Eq. (8), u(p,w) turns from the ﬁrst branch to the second branch
when p =
2w(1+R)
1+R−γ(R−r), where u(p,w) = π






≥ 0, i.e., (1+R)w ≤ π
2v, then with u(·,w) strictly decreasing, ˜ p(w)
must be the root of the second branch of (8), i.e.,
πv
2





π(1 + R − γ(R − r)) = 0,






≤ 0, i.e., (1 + R)w ≥ π







(1 + R − γ(R − r)) = 0,
which gives the second branch of (9).
Note that the two branches of Eq. (9) are equal to each other when (1 + R)w = π
2v.
Now we are ready to characterize the equilibrium.
Proposition 1 There is an equilibrium where any bidder with any quantity w ≥ 0 of initially













2((1−γ)(1+R)+πγ(1−r)) ≤ w ≤ πv
2(1+R)
πv
1+R−γ(R−r) if w ≥ πv
2(1+R),
(10)
and, if the bidder is the winner and the highest losing bid is p, defaults if and only if the
realized value of the toxic asset is 0 and (7) holds.
Proof By the private-value payoﬀ function characterized by Lemma 2 and the budget
constraint (1), a fact in auction theory (e.g., Che and Gale [1]) implies that the dominant









By Eq. (9), as w increases from 0 to πv
2(1+R), ˜ p(w) decreases from v
1+R−γ(R−r) to πv
1+R−γ(R−r)
and then stays at that level constantly as w increases further. Thus, there exists a unique
ˆ w > 0 such that












(1 − γ)(1 + R)
>
πv
1 + R − γ(R − r)
,
we have ˆ w < πv
2(1+R). Thus, ˆ w must be the solution such that the ﬁrst branch of the right-hand
side of (9) is equal to 2w
1−γ, i.e.,
πv − 2(1 − π)(1 + R)ˆ w








2((1 − γ)(1 + R) + πγ(1 − r))
. (12)
Then (11) implies (10). The rest of the proposition directly follows from Lemma 1.
64 The Default-Exacerbating Consequence
The policy-maker’s goal of auctioning oﬀ the toxic assets, I presume, is to encourage private
investors to share with taxpayers the risk of toxic assets and to mitigate the default crisis in
the ﬁnancial sector. The auction plan, however, fares poorly in fulﬁlling the goal.
First, let us inspect the equilibrium bid function characterized by Proposition 1.
Corollary 1 In the equilibrium characterized by Proposition 1,
a. a bidder’s bid p∗(w) is strictly increasing in w when w ≤ ˆ w, strictly decreasing in w
when ˆ w ≤ w ≤ πv
2(1+R), and is equal to the constant πv
1+R−γ(R−r) when w ≥ πv
2(1+R),
b. p∗(w) ≥ πv
1+R−γ(R−r) when w ≥ w∗, where
w∗ =
(1 − γ)πv
2(1 + R − γ(R − r))
. (13)
Proof Claim (a) follows from the equilibrium bid function, Eq. (9). To prove claim (b),





at which the ﬁrst branch of the right-hand
side of (10) is equal to the third branch in (10). Solving that equation yields (13).
Thus, bidders with initially owned assets between w∗ and πv
2(1+R) bid higher than bidders
with larger initially owned assets. Why do such “poor” bidders bid more aggressively than
their richer rivals? That is because with little initially owned asset a winner would have
little to lose if he defaults when the toxic asset turns out to be unsalvageable. (The bidders
with types less than w∗ cannot bid aggressively, due to their severe budget constraints.)
Hence the auction may result in an adverse outcome: ﬁnancially capable bidders lose
the auction to some of their ﬁnancially constrained rivals. As formalized in the next corollary,
such ﬁnancially constrained bidders are more prone to bankruptcies, thereby exacerbating
the default problem already troubling the policy-makers.
Corollary 2 Suppose there are at least two bidders with types above w∗ and at least one of
them has types less than πv
2(1+R), then any winner of the auction defaults when ex post V = 0.
Proof Denote w for the type of the winner and p for the price for the toxic asset. By












. Thus, w < πv
2(1+R). By hypothesis, there are at least two bidders whose types
are above w∗, hence Corollary 1(b) implies that the highest losing bid, i.e., p, is at least as
high as πv/(1 + R − γ(R − r). Thus, p(1 + R − γ(R − r)) ≥ πv > 2w(1 + R), so (7) holds.
Then Lemma 1 implies that the winner defaults if V = 0.
By Corollary 2, unless only one bidder participates in the auction, which would gen-
erate a depressing zero price for the toxic asset, the probability with which default occurs










where w(2) denotes the second highest type among the bidders. Although the outcome of
“heads I win, tails the taxpayers lose” speculated by Krugman does not occur for sure, it is
more probable when there are more bidders, because the probability (14) goes to one as the
number of bidders goes to inﬁnity, as long as πv
2(1+R) > w∗, which is guaranteed by γ > 0.
One might hope to avoid this default-exacerbating outcome by excluding the private
investors of types below πv
2(1+R) from the auction. But a truthful diagnosis of the ﬁnancial
health of various ﬁrms may be costly, if not impossible, for the government to obtain. After
all, how many people knew a year ago the ﬁnancial troubles of AIG and the like?
5 Alternative Mechanisms
The driving force for the buyers of toxic assets to default is the loans provided to them by the
government. Thus, a trivial mechanism that eliminates the default problem is to oﬀer no loan
to these buyers. That amounts to setting the parameter γ to be zero, so that w∗ = πv
2(1+R)
by Eq. (13). Then the interval in (14) is degenerate, and the budget constraint (1) becomes
p ≤ 2w, implying that the condition (7) for default never holds.
This no-loan mechanism, however, might oﬀer little help to stimulate the demand for
the toxic assets, given that many private investors are currently ﬁnancially constrained.
An alternative mechanism, which provides loans and may mitigate the default danger,
has been analyzed by an early article of mine, Zheng [4]. There, the winning bidder is allowed
to borrow from the government only up to the amount by which the price of the object exceeds
the winner’s initially endowed wealth. In that article, it is proved that if the interest rate for
such a loan is above a threshold, 1−π
π , then rich bidders win and the probability of default is
8low. That is because, to ﬁnance the same payment in that mechanism, a rich bidder would
have less debt liability than a poor bidder. Thus, the cost to ﬁnance a payment is low for
rich bidders and high for poor bidders, while the cost to default is high for rich bidders and
low for poor bidders. When the borrowing rate is above the threshold, the ﬁnancing cost
outweighs the default cost, so rich bidders outbid poor bidders and default only with a small
probability. As long as the borrowing rate is still below the market rate, the bidders are still
ﬁnancially subsidized. With the bidding competition intensiﬁed by the subsidy, the expected
revenue and sometimes even the expected proﬁt for the government are higher than those
without the subsidy ([4, Proposition 4.2]).
To implement the alternative mechanism, the government needs to have a truthful
assessment on a winning bidder’s asset after the auction. That is no easy task, but still more
doable than getting a truthful assessment on every bidder’s asset before the auction, which
is needed to rule out the type of adverse outcomes demonstrated in the previous section.
A cautionary note, however, is that the alternative mechanism is also prone to the
default problem if the ﬁnancial subsidy is overly generous. It is proved in Zheng [4] that
there is a “high bids and broke winners” equilibrium similar to the one in this paper if the
borrowing rate is below the threshold 1−π
π . With such a low borrowing rate, the ﬁnancing
cost is outweighed by the default cost, so rich bidders cannot outbid poor bidders.
References
[1] Yeon-Koo Che and Ian Gale. Standard auctions with ﬁnancially constrained bidders.
Review of Economic Studies, 65:1–21, 1998.
[2] Paul Krugman. Despair over Financial Policy. The New York Times, March 24, 2009.
[3] U.S. Department of Treasury. Fact Sheet: Public-Private Investment Program, March
23, 2009. Press Release.
[4] Charles Z. Zheng. High Bids and Broke Winners. Journal of Economic Theory, 100:129–
171, 2001.
9